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The contrast between the reception of Anselm’s Proslogion in the work of
Bonaventure and in the work of Thomas Aquinas is often held up as a
classic example of their competing intellectual assumptions. Some have
located the intellectual prerequisites for the acceptance or rejection of
Anselm’s argument in the prior acceptance of univocal or analogical ac-
counts of being.1 P. A. Daniels argued that the prerequisites for Bonaven-
ture’s acceptance of the argument were not his “ontological” mode of
thought, or a doctrine of the innate idea of God within the soul, but in his
acceptance of examplar causality.2 Half a century later, Jean Chattillon,
following Étienne Gilson, affirmed the more common view of the issue, that
the acceptance or rejection of Anselm’s argument among the first scholas-
tics of the thirteenth century depended upon their allegiance to Augus-
tinian or Aristotelian traditions.3 Anton Pegis did the same when he insisted
that recovery of the Anselmian argument in its original form involved
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1. In general terms, the interpretation of Bonaventure as leader of an Au-
gustinian tradition, and of Thomas as representative of Aristotelianism, can be
found in the work of E. Gilson, A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages
(London, 1978). On Bonaventure’s refinement of Anselm in the context of the
Augustinian tradition, see H. R. Klocker, S.J. “Bonaventure’s Refinement of the
Ontological Argument,” Mediaevilla 4 (1978): 209–23. On anological and univocal
accounts of being as factors determining attitudes to Anselm’s argument, see H. J.
Johnson, “Contra Anselm But Contra Gentiles: Aquinas’s Rejection of the Ontologi-
cal Argument,” Schede Medievali 13 (1986): 18–27.
2. P. A. Daniels, Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise
im Dreizehnten Jahrhundert (Münster, 1909), pp. 131, 156.
3. Jean Chattillon, “De Guillaume d’Auxerre à Saint Thomas d’Aquin: L’Ar-
gument de Saint Anselme Chez Les Premiers Scolastiques du XIIIe Siècle,” Spicile-
gium Beccense 1 (1959): 209–31.
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stripping away the Aristotelian framework in terms of which the Proslogion
has been read since Thomas.4
For the most part, these accounts have been concerned to work out the
significance of intellectual assumptions for the interpretation of Anselm’s
argument, and less concerned with the question of why Anselm’s argument
received so much attention in the middle of the thirteenth century. Histo-
rians reacting against simple Augustinian versus Aristotelian interpretation
of early scholasticism, however, have tended to make the reasons for the
choice of particular philosophical sources a matter of personal philosophi-
cal preference—which is something of a truism.5 By placing the interpreta-
tions of Anselm’s argument offered by Bonaventure and Thomas in the
context of the religious interests of their wider communities, as well as
alongside the interpretations of near-contemporaries within the Franciscan
and Dominican orders, a more informative picture emerges. The prereq-
uisites for the acceptance or rejection of Anselm’s argument then begin to
look more like the broader religious assumptions embedded in the life of
the orders which Anselm’s argument helped to articulate, than specific
philosophical doctrines. As such, the reception of Anselm’s argument is
suggestive about the role of philosophical argument in the theological
context of medieval scholasticism, and about the factors which conditioned
textual receptivity in this period more generally.
I
The early hagiographies of Saint Francis reflect the divergent political and
spiritual interests which were already threatening the unity of the Franciscan
community. The early accounts did agree in one respect, however: Saint
Francis was significant to the community because of his intimate, personal re-
lationship with the divine. This was the intimacy which inspired Saint Fran-
cis’s followers whether they were clerics, laypersons, literates, or illiterates.6
To argue that the Franciscan approach to Anselm’s argument reflected
4. Anton C. Pegis, “St. Anselm and the Argument of the “Proslogion”,” Medie-
val Studies 28 (1966): 228–67.
5. For example, see J. F. Quinn, The Historical Constitution of St Bonaventure’s
Philosophy (Toronto, 1973), pp. 881–82: “In selecting their sources and in gathering
their materials, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure make their choices chiefly on the
grounds of their personal and philosophical perspectives, which guide their indi-
vidual approaches to the truth. Consequently, as St. Bonaventure’s philosophy is
neither fundamentally Augustinian nor essentially a Neoplatonizing Aristotelean-
ism, but Bonaventurean, so also the philosophy of St. Thomas is neither basically
Aristotelian nor essentially a neoplatonizing Aristoteleanism, but Thomist.”
6. For the sources of the life of St. Francis and their political contexts, see J.
R. H. Moorman, Sources of the Life of St. Francis (Manchester, 1940). For the role of
Franciscan hagiography in contesting the legacy of St. Francis, see Duncan Nimmo,
Reform and Division in the Franciscan Order (Rome, 1987).
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identifiably Franciscan sensibilities, therefore, is by no means controversial.7
Alexander of Hales’s treatment of the mind’s natural knowledge of God in
his early Glossa reflects not an attempt to provide foundations for belief but
an attempt to give an account of the intimate relationship between God and
the human soul.8 Citing Augustine, Alexander argues that the soul ap-
proaches a knowledge of God by stages in which reason serves a spiritual end.
The first stage of the soul’s cleansing is when the soul is removed from
contemplating the senses, the second when it is removed from the
contemplation of itself, and the third when it is elevated above itself.9
Before passing on to talk of the mind’s natural knowledge of God as Trinity
from the image of God within the soul, Alexander uses Anselm’s argument
to explain why the mind cannot even think that God does not exist.
That than which no greater can be thought is God. But greater is that
which exists both in reality and in the understanding than that which
exists in the understanding alone. Greater again is that which cannot
be thought not to be than that which, though existing in reality, may
be thought not to exist. Therefore, God is so great that God cannot
even be thought not to exist. Why then do the psalms speak of the fool
who says in his heart ‘there is no God?’ It is because it is one thing to
think the exterior word, another to think the inner word, which is the
meaning of the thing.10
Alexander distinguishes between thinking of the words alone and thinking
about the meaning of the words—a passage which leads on to a discussion
of the image of God as Trinity within the soul.
What is significant about the Summa Fratris Alexandris, initiated when
Alexander entered the order formally in 1236 and completed after his
death in 1245, is neither its claims to originality nor, as Efrem Bettoni
7. It is also the view of the Franciscan school presented by Étienne Gilson, in
History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1978), and in The Christian
Philosophy of St Bonaventure (London, 1940).
8. See Alexander of Hales, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi
(Quaracchi, 1951), vol. i.
9. Glossa, dist. ii, art. 3: “Augustinus, libro De Quantitate animae: Una purgatio
mentis est, cum removetur a sensibus; secunda purgatio est, cum removetur a
contemplatione sui; tertia, cum elevatur supra se.” Unless stated otherwise, all
translations are my own.
10. Glossa, dist. iii, art. 12, i. “Quo maius excogitari non potest, est Deus. Sed
maius est quod cogitatur esse in re et intellectu, quam quod cogitatur intellectu so-
lum. Maius est iterum illud quod cogitari potest esse et non potest cogitari non esse,
quam quod cogitari potest esse et potest cogitari non esse cum sit. Erit ergo Deus bo-
num quod non est tantum in intellectu et non est cogitari non esse. Quod autem dici-
tur in Psalmo: Dixit insipiens in corde suo non est Deus, nota: est dupliciter dicere: verbo
exteriori, et sic verum est; vel interiori, quod est verbum rei, et sic est impossibile.”
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argued, that it expressed Alexander’s personal synthesis.11 It is significant
not only because it expands upon these teachings of the Glossa, but also,
and primarily, because in doing so it also echoes the views of other Francis-
cans. Four contemporary Franciscan commentaries—emanating from Odo
Rigaldi and his disciples—show that, even in its early sections dealing with
the knowledge of God, the Summa offers a synthesis of views held by others
within the order. More than the Glossa, the Summa and the commentaries
of the Franciscan school concern themselves with the problem of those who
say, like the fool, “there is no God,” and in doing so offer explanations that
go beyond the Glossa.12 This emphasis reflects the way in which the Francis-
can account of God’s relationship with the soul became an invaluable
means of explaining human knowledge more generally.
Defending Anselm’s argument, Odo Rigaldi explains that the fool errs
not only because of a failure to think the meaning of “that than which no
greater can be thought,” but because the fool also looks for God in the
wrong place. The fool errs by taking the absence of immediate retribution
on the wicked as a sign that God is not just—and therefore less than
something than which no greater can be thought.13 Odo de Rosny follows
Rigaldi word for word in an abbreviation of Rigaldi’s commentary.14 An-
other disciple of Rigaldi combines Anselm’s argument with the doctrine of
John of Damascus, that the knowledge of God is naturally impressed upon
the soul, and with Hugh of St. Victor’s teaching that, in reflecting upon
itself, the soul traces its existence back to God. According to this commen-
tary, the source of the fool’s error lies in the sin which has obscured the
book of creatures to the soul.15 Finally, another commentary ascribed to
11. Efrem Bettoni, Il Problema della conoscibilita’ di Dio nella scuola Francescana
(Padua, 1950), pp. 8, 22. See also the discussion concerning the authorship in V.
Doucet, Prolegomena, in Doctoris Irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales, Summa Theologica,
ed. by PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 5 vols. (Quaracchi; Collegium S. Bonaventurae,
1924–1979), p. v.
12. Alexander, Summa, intro. q. ii. m. iii, c. iv, respondeo: “Tertia ratio est
revocatio infidelium ad fidem: sicut enim dicit Ioannes Damascenus, I libro, “quam-
vis cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter nobis inserta sit, tamen in tantum praevaluit
perniciosa malitia hominum naturae, aut dicant non esse Deum, secundum quod
dicit David: ‘Dixit insipiens in corde suo: non est Deus.’” Propterea, ad tales
revocandos necessariae sunt rationes.”
13. Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. lat. 14910, fol. 7r. “Sic (Deus) potest putari
non esse iustus ratione alicuius occulti effectis . . . sic dixit insipiens in corde suo
Deum non esse.”
14. Troyes, ms. lat. 1245 (Clairvaux), fols 4v–5r.
15. Paris, BN. ms. lat. 3424, fols. 12r–12v. “Cognitio uero in actu duplex est.
Una est cum movetur anima est superiore parte rationis et habitus similitudinis
primae veritatis superiori parti rationis impressa. Eo modo quo recolit suum prin-
cipium et per hoc videt se non esse a se. Et hoc est modo non potest ignorare deum
esse . . . Alia est cum movetur anima inferiore partem rationis qui est ad contem-
plandas creaturas et hoc modo potest non cognoscere deum esse. Omnia scilicet
peccatum in errorem auersa a deo obtenebantur et hoc modo dicit insipiens in
corde suo non est deus.”
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one of Rigaldi’s disciples, although not concerned to resolve the problem
of the fool directly, explains the differences between the knowledge of
creatures and the knowledge of God. In the experience of the senses,
creatures are more known to the soul than God is, since God is not an object
of sensual knowledge. In the experience of the understanding, however, the
knowledge of God is more certain since God is the highest intelligible and
is innate within the rational spirit.16 Although there is not enough room
here to examine the ways in which tensions between the texts are taken up
in the Summa, we can see it working through the same positions.
The critical point being made in this discussion is that natural knowl-
edge must begin with God, not with the senses: it is nature that is understood
through God and not God through nature. It is the inversion of this order
that leads to the error of the fool. Hence, the very argument that so neatly
encapsulates the central conviction of Franciscan spirituality also provides an
invaluable tool for explaining the divergences of Aristotelian science from
Christian truth. According to the Summa, and at least one commentary of the
school, the soul’s natural potential for knowing God can be actualized in two
ways. The first way is by means of introspection: the superior part of reason
reflects upon itself and sees that it does not have its existence from itself. In
this way it is not able to ignore the existence of God. When the soul seeks
knowledge beyond itself through contemplation of creatures, however, it can
remain ignorant of God’s existence. The part of the soul that is designed for
the contemplation of creatures is the part corrupted by sin and turned from
God.17 Without faith, the soul does not see the world in its true light.
This move is critical because according to Franciscan teaching, the soul
knows all that it knows through God, and the knowledge of God is im-
pressed upon the soul as its knowledge of truth.18 It is the nature of the
16. Paris, BN. ms. lat. 10640, fol. 5r. “Queritur utrum cognitio de deo sit
certior quam de creatura vel easdem. . . . Si per experientiam sensus sic cognitio de
creatura certior eo quia Creator est non obiectum sensus. Si vero sit cognitio per
experientia intellectus sic cognitio de deo certior eo quia ipse est summe intelligi-
bilis . . . Si uero sit cognitio actualis quae est per causam . . . cognitio dei est certior
eo quia innata sit animae rationali.”
17. Alexander, Summa, lib. I, q.i, c. ii, art. ii, Solutio: “Cognitio vero in actu
duplex est. Una est, cum movetur anima secundum partem superiorem rationis et
habitum similitudinis primae veritatis superiori parti rationis impressum, eo modo
quo recolit suum principium per hoc quod videt se non esse a se. Et hoc etiam
modo non potest ignorare Deum esse in ratione sui principii. Alia est, cum movetur
anima secundum partem inferiorem rationis, quae est ad contemplandas creaturas.
Et hoc modo potest non cognoscere Deum esse, cum scilicet per peccatum et
errorem aversa a Deo obtenebratur.” Compare the commentary of Odo Rigaldi’s
disciple in Paris, BN, ms. lat. 3424, fols 12r–12v, quoted above.
18. For example, Paris, BN, ms. lat. 3424. fols 12r–12v: “Ad illud quod ultimus
queritur utrum anima possit ignorare deum. Dicendum quia cognitio de deo habitu
naturaliter est impressa nobis. . . . quia naturaliter impresa in intellectum est simili-
tudo primae veritatis qui potest cognoscere deum esse. Et non potest ignorari ab
anima rationali.”
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relationship between God and soul which explains both the unthinkability
of God’s not existing, and the error of the fool’s confession: the soul falls
into error when it is distracted from the inner, spiritual truth by the mate-
rial, sensual realm. The use of Anselm’s argument in the Summa articulates
a doctrine of God which encapsulates a particular approach to natural
knowledge. In this account, the knowledge of God is prior to the knowledge
of all else, and the attainment of divine knowledge is dependent upon
spiritual progress. Ignorance is inextricably bound with sin.
Not all Franciscans of the period accepted the teaching of the Parisian
school, however. At Oxford, opinions were divided. Although following the
Parisian school’s methods, Richard Rufus of Cornwall represented a differ-
ent approach to natural science. As Peter Raedts has argued, Rufus eschews
a theological appraoch to creation in favour of a naturalistic interpretation
that emphasised the mundane laws of physics.19 Unlike his Parisian contem-
poraries, he was critical of Anselm’s argument, arguing that it did not show
that God’s existence was indubitable. Anticipating Aquinas, Rufus distin-
guished between the realm of thought and of reality. While in definition
“something than which no greater can be thought” cannot be thought not
to be, it is always possible to think that this “something” does not refer to
anything in actual existence.20
However, another Franciscan master at Oxford, Thomas of York, ap-
pears to present his account of Anselm’s argument against this kind of
criticism.21 The Sapientiale shifts the emphasis back from proof about the
existence of something external to the self (where Rufus placed it) to what
can or cannot actually be thought about God—the knowledge of whose
existence being already implanted within the soul. According to Thomas,
those who think it possible to deny God thereby confess that they are not
thinking about God at all.22 While Rufus provides an example of an Oxford
master who differed from the Parisian school over the soul’s natural knowl-
19. Peter Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Oxford Tradition of Theology
(Oxford, 1987), pp. 181ff.
20. Gedeon Gál, “Viae ad Exsistentiam Dei Probandam in Doctrina Richardi
Rufi O.F.M.,” Franciscan Studies 38 (1970): 177–202 (193). “Sed ego illam secundam
darem hypothesim, scilicet: aliquis cogitat nihil entium esse quo maius cogitari non
potest.”
21. See Ephrem Longpré, “Fr. Thomas d’York, O.F.M. La Première Somme
Métaphysique du XIIIe Siècle,” Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 19 (1926):
875–930.
22. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, consulted in Vatican ms. lat. 4301, fols 8r–8v
and Vatican ms. lat. 6771, fol. 23v.: “Sed forte hoc argumento respondebat aliis et
dicet quia non est tale aliquid quo maius excogitari non potest in effectu sed tantum
in intellectu nam quamuis non habet suppostium in res significatum tum potest
esse in intellectu vel cogitacione. Prout dicit anselmus in eodem quia aliter res cum
vox ea significata cogitur et cum ea ipsa quod res intelligitur . . . Contra igitur hanc
responsionem insipientis interest anselmus declarare . . . quia tanta vis est significa-
tionis huius quo maius excogitari non potest ut si cogitat sequitur necessitate quia
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edge of God, Thomas of York is an example of one who, contemporane-
ously and independently of the Parisian school as a whole, arrived at a
similar position. Significantly, perhaps, although Richard Rufus went to
Paris during the 1250s to study the work of Bonaventure, it was Thomas of
York who was to represent the order beside Bonaventure in defense of
Franciscan interests against secular attacks during this period.23
In the light of these differences within the Franciscan community,
Bonaventure’s declaration at the beginning of his second book of sentences
has an added significance. There he declared that just as he had adhered
in the first book to the common opinions of the masters and especially to
“our master and father” Alexander, so in the remainder he would not turn
back “from their footsteps.”24 While Rufus studied Bonaventure’s teachings
in Paris, he continued to maintain an independent approach that was not
appreciated by all within his order.25 The significance of Bonaventure’s
contribution appears to lie not in its originality or uniqueness, but in the
extent to which it gave expression to a wider body of opinion—but a body
of opinion that still needed defending within the context of the order itself.
Like the Franciscan Summa, Bonaventure’s treatment of the natural
knowledge of God is concerned with explaining how God is such that God
cannot be thought not to exist.26 His fullest treatment is found in the
questions disputed in 1253–1254, after he had completed his lectures on
sit in effectu.” Thomas concludes later: “Hiis ergo sunt modis quibus sapientes
devenerunt in cognitionem dei. Superior quod occurrit questio non praecedens
evidentia (quoniam dixit insipiens in corde suo non est deus) maxime cum divini-
tatis nominatio omnibus impressa sit . . . Nam qui dicit deum in corde suo non esse
dixit deum non esse deum et tunc actione modo fatetur esse deum.”
23. Opinion over Rufus among the English Franciscans was certainly divided:
Roger Bacon reserved some of his severest criticisms for Rufus, while Thomas of
Eccleston praised him and stated that in Paris he was regarded as a great and
admirable philosopher. See Peter Raedts, Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tra-
dition of Oxford Theology (Oxford, 1987), pp. 5, 7–9. Thomas of York took part
with Bonaventure in a disputation against the secular critic, William of St. Amour.
See J. G. Bougerol Introduction to the Works of St Bonaventure (New Jersey, 1963),
p. 118.
24. Bonaventure, Opera Theologica Selecta (Quaracchi, 1934), In II sententiarum,
proemii, i: “Ad quemadmodum in primo libro sententiis adhaesi et communibus
opinionibus magistrorum, et potissime magistri et patris nostri bonae memoriae
fratris Alexandri, sic in consequentibus libris ad eorum vestigiis non recedam.”
Proemii, ii, “Et licet fortassis aliquis eum in aliquibus harum opinionum sustineat,
verumtamen pater et magister noster bonae memoriae frater Alexander in nulla
harum ipsum sustinuit, sed potius contrarium sensit, cuius vestigiis praecipue in-
haerere propono.”
25. That Rufus’s continued independence was disliked by at least one contem-
porary is shown by Gedeon Gál, “Opiniones Richardi Rufi Cornubiensis a Censore
Reprobatae,” Franciscan Studies 34 (1975): 136–93, which discusses Rufus’s dissent
from Bonaventure’s doctrines and the remarks of a censor on the manuscript of
Rufus’s abbreviation of Bonaventure’s commentary.
26. Bonaventure, In I sententiarum, dist. viii, art. i, q. ii, concl.
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the Sentences, entitled On the Mystery of the Trinity.27 Bonaventure introduces
the work with a preamble which is divided into two questions, the first
concerning “the foundation of all knowledge” (the indubitability of God’s
existence) and the second, “the foundation of all faith” (the doctrine of the
Trinity). In the first question, Bonaventure adduces no less than twenty-
nine separate reasons from authority and argument to show that God’s
existence is an indubitable truth. Following the early Glossa of Alexander of
Hales, Bonaventure divides these into three stages of the soul’s cleansing as
it journeys within, outside, and above itself (intra se, extra se, supra se), and
stresses the relationship of knowledge to love and desire.28 The first way
stresses the knowledge of God implanted within the soul; the second, that
creation itself infers the necessity of God’s being; and the third way, led by
Anselm’s argument, that God cannot be thought not to exist. All three ways
show that God’s existence is indubitable.
Once again, however, this account brings to the fore the fool who says
in his heart “there is no god.” The conclusion of Anselm’s argument is not
merely that God exists both in the mind and in reality, but that God exists
so truly that God cannot be thought not to exist. It is this which makes the
fool a problem. For the Franciscans, however, the fool does not show that
God’s existence is dubitable, but that the weakness of the human mind
makes error possible with respect to the most indubitable of all truths: the
cause of doubt lies with us, not with God.
There are three sources of error, according to Bonaventure: in concep-
tion, reasoning, and conclusion.29 The mind errs in conception when it
does not rightly receive the significance of the name ‘God’, and this is true
of the Fool who says in his heart “there is no God,” and of idolaters who call
mundane things ‘God’.30 Following the commentary of Odo Rigaldi, and
reversing the emphasis of his Dominican contemporaries, Bonaventure
argues that reason errs when it concludes from the absence of immediate
retribution upon the impious that there is no rule within the universe, and
therefore that there is no first and highest governor of the universe.31
Finally, like his Parisian predecessors, Bonaventure affirms the priority of
spiritual over sensual knowledge: the error of conclusion occurs when the
27. P. Glorieux, Répertoire des maîtres au XIIIe siècle, 2 vols. (Paris; repr. Vrin,
1971), pp. 2:305c.
28. Bonaventure, Opera Omnia (Quarracchi, 1882–1902), De Mysterio Trinitatis,
q. i, art. i, conclusio: “Deum esse est verum indubitabile, quia sive intellectus
ingrediatur intra se, sive egrediatur extra se, sive aspiciat supra se; si rationabiliter
decurrit, certitudinaliter et indubitanter Deum esse cognoscit.” See also De Mysterio
Trinitatis, q. i, concl. 10.
29. De Mysterio, q. i, art. i, conclusio.
30. De Mysterio, q. i, art. i, solutio, 1, 2, 3.
31. De Mysterio, q. i, art. i, conclusio. cf. Paris, BN ms. lat. 14910, fol. 7v: “Sed
prout videmus et cognoscemus eum in creaturis et in effectibus suis sic [Deus]
potest putari non esse iustus ratione alicuius occulti effectes . . . sic dixit insipiens
in corde suo Deum non esse.”
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carnal intellect, so tied to the realm of the senses, is unable to raise itself to
the incorporeal substance that is the first principle of things.32 Once again,
reason is subordinate to the orientation of the will, and the soul must
orientate itself toward the inner light. Its not that Anselm’s argument helps
justify the view that understanding depends upon faith (how would it be
possible to justify such a view outside of faith?). Rather, it contributes to an
account of the God that such an approach to knowledge presupposes.
The implications for natural knowledge in the Franciscan doctrine are
illustrated by the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, composed by Bonaventure in
part to win over that section of the Franciscan community most critical of
learning within the order; but partly also to reinforce the Franciscan iden-
tity of a community that could not be described as idiota et subditus omnibus.33
The work represents an articulation of natural knowledge properly orien-
tated toward God. At the beginning Bonaventure insists “no one is in any
way disposed for divine contemplation that leads to mystical ecstasy unless
like Daniel he is a man of desires” (Dan. 9:23).34 The creatures contemplated
at the beginning of the journey are contemplated as images, shadows, and
vestiges of the Trinity.35 God is implied by all beings and in all thought, such
that all things are understood through God.
In the course of the journey itself, Anselm’s argument is employed
after the soul has contemplated creatures and has been inwardly reformed
and illuminated by the grace of God. Turning above itself, the soul contem-
plates God according to the two names that signify God as beginning and
end and as unity and trinity: being and the good. In the fifth stage the
wayfarer contemplates God as Being and unity, drawing upon the dictum
that “God cannot be thought not to be.” That which underpins all being
underpins all knowledge:
He . . . who wishes to contemplate the invisible things of God in relation
to the unity of His essence should fix the attention of his soul on Being
Itself and see that Being Itself is so absolutely certain that it cannot be
thought not to be . . . Being, however, does not come to us by means of
something else, because everything that is grasped by the intellect is
32. De Mysterio Trinitatis, q. i, art. i, concl.
33. The quotation comes from the Testament of St. Francis, cit. in Moorman,
Sources, 54. For an account of the ways in which Bonaventure’s Itinerarium represents
an attempt to reconcile the diverse interests of the Franciscan order during a
turbulent period in its early history, see Ewart Cousins, “Francis of Assisi: Christian
Mysticism at the Crossroads,” in S. Katz, Mysticism and Religious Traditions (Oxford,
1983), pp. 163–90. See also Cousins’s introduction to his translation of the Itinerar-
ium in Bonaventure, The Soul’s Journey into God and the Tree of Life (New York, 1978),
pp. 1–48.
34. Bonaventure, Opera Omnia (Quarracchi, 1882–1902), vol. v, Itinerarium
mentis in Deum, prol. 3: “Non enim dispositus est aliquo modo ad contemplationes
divinas, quae ad mentales ducunt excessus, nisi cum Daniele sit vir desideriorum.”
35. Itinerarium, i–ii.
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grasped either as non-being, or as being in potency, or as being in act. If
therefore, non-being cannot be grasped except through being, and if
being in potency cannot be understood except through being in actual-
ity, and if being designates the pure actuality of being, then being is that
which first comes into the intellect, and this being is that which is pure
act. But this being is not particular being, which is a limited being, since
it is mixed with potentiallity; nor is it analogous being, for that has the
least of act because it least exists. It remains, therefore, that the being
which we are considering is the Divine Being.36
In this stage Anselm’s argument helps reveal the foundation or beginning of
knowledge in Being Itself. In the sixth stage it helps also to reveal its end.
Here Bonaventure considers God as the Trinity in its name which is ‘the
Good’. This time Bonaventure begins his discussion with the other dictum of
Anselm’s argument, that God is “that than which no greater can be thought”:
Behold, therefore, and observe that the highest good is unqualifiedly
that in comparison with which a greater cannot be thought. And this
good is such that it cannot rightly be thought of as non-existing, since
to be is absolutely better than not to be. And this good exists in such a
way that it cannot rightly be thought of as triune and one.37
The Anselmian argument is here tied to the pseudo-Dionysian theology of
self-diffusive goodness; a goodness that is only satisfied in three-fold diffu-
sion. The seventh and final stage of the journey is a contemplation of the
second person of this trinity; it is here that the soul attains perfect illumina-
tion, for here it contemplates the perfect image of God that is the model
for humanity. Moreover, it is in contemplation that the soul imitates Christ,
since Christ is the Logos or contemplation of the Father. Hence, contempla-
tion has become as much part of the imitation of Christ as poverty and
humility. Yet it is a contemplation which has reached beyond the intellec-
tual capacity of the soul. Francis reappears, for the first time since the
beginning of the journey, this time “as an example of perfect contempla-
tion, just as previously he had been of action.” Having considered God as
that than which no greater can be thought, the soul passes over its own
intellectual capacities and reclaims the ignorance of Saint Francis:
And thus, through him, more by example than by word, God would
invite all truly spiritual men to this passing over in this transport of the
soul . . . In this passing over, if it is to be perfect, all intellectual activities
ought to be relinquished and the most profound affection transported
to God, and transformed into Him.38
36. Itinerarium, v.
37. Itinerarium, vi.
38. Itinerarium, vii.
92 SCOTT MATTHEWS
The approach to knowledge that dominated the early works of the
Franciscans carried their tradition forward by reconciling the religious life
with inquiry in a way which explained the errors of its opponents. When we
realize that Franciscans were being trained to articulate and defend their
doctrinal assumptions against potentially sophisticated unbelievers, then
the attraction of this approach to knowledge and to Anselm’s role within it
becomes clearer. The fool’s denial of that which was the most indubitable
truth of the human mind was a symptom of the spiritual character of
knowledge. Error flows from spiritual distance from God, just as knowledge
directed by God leads to a transformation of the soul. In the Itinerarium
contemplation itself transforms the soul into the image of that which it
contemplates: the divine exemplar which is the truth of all things and is the
source of truth within the soul. All science will go astray unless it begins and
ends in the God of Christian truth. Moreover, faith allows the believer to
understand that which transcends unaided reason. The resolution of intel-
lectual problems through the application of doctrines of the faith was the
life work of Saint Bonaventure.
For a community that emphasized preaching by example over preach-
ing by word of mouth, the dependence of understanding upon faith was an
acceptable, even desirable, conclusion. The transformation of the soul was
the goal of contemplation—a transformation which had outward results. To
become Christ-like was a product of familiarity with the divine—but it was
also the key to converting others by example. As a basis for rational dis-
course, however, this approach would appear to have serious limitations. If
understanding depends upon faith then reason becomes redundant in
dialogues between believer and unbeliever. What about a community whose
whole vocation was orientated toward verbal persuasion? Saint Dominic had
invested the interests of his order in just such an account of the religious
life when he took the radical step of sending his friars to be trained at the
universities.39
II
Chattillon, Pegis, and others have remarked that, in approaching Anselm’s
argument, Aquinas was reacting to his contemporaries rather than to An-
selm himself.40 Aquinas approached Anselm by reframing the question of
the knowledge of God’s existence, and asking “whether God’s existence is
39. See W. A. Hinnebusch, The History of the Dominican Order: Intellectual and
Cultural Life to 1500, vol. ii (New York, 1973) chap. 1 “The Dominican order and
learning.” “Study,” wrote Humber of Romans, “is not the purpose of the Order but
is exceedingly needful for the ends we have mentioned, namely, preaching and
working for the salvation of souls, for without study we can achieve neither” cit. in
ibid., pp. 3–4.
40. Jean Chattillon, “De Guillaume,” p. 210.
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self-evident.” Those who follow Anselm and John of Damascus in claiming
that the knowledge of God is naturally inserted in the soul and that God’s
existence cannot be denied are claiming, according to Aquinas, that
God’s existence is self-evident. God’s being is identical with God’s exist-
ence, Aquinas argues, and is therefore self-evident in itself. That we cannot
conceive what God is, however, shows that God’s being is known to us
neither by implanted knowledge nor by direct experience. God’s existence,
therefore, is not self-evident to us.41 It is knowledge that must be inferred
from creatures.
Is Aquinas’s discussion of Anselm’s argument reflective of a wider
Dominican account of the relationship between God and the Soul? Though
historians have been willing to see Bonaventure and his Franciscan contem-
poraries as expressing a Franciscan spirituality through their philosophy,
historians have been less inclined to view Aquinas and the Dominican order
in quite this way. As Simon Tugwell has written, “the early Dominicans were
not particularly concerned, either for themselves or for others, with what
has come to be called the ‘interior life’.”42 The lack of concern with an
interior  spirituality  has often  been  understood to mean  that  the  early
Dominicans did not really possess a spirituality at all. As Simon Tugwell
makes clear, however, it was precisely in their rejection of ‘interiority’ that
the key to Dominican spirituality is to be found.43
By contrast with Saint Francis, Saint Dominic rarely, if ever, made
appeal to personal revelation, whether visual, auditory, or otherwise, to
authenticate his teaching, or to supplement the authority of his wishes for
his order. Nor did he ever claim exposure to direct auditory or visual
experience of Christ. Instead of insisting, as Francis had, that his order have
a rule of its own dictated by the Holy Spirit, Dominic adopted the constitu-
tions of the Augustinian canons of Premontré. The modifications intro-
duced by the Dominican General Chapter (and not by Dominic personally)
illustrate that whereas Francis considered preaching to depend upon the
apostolic life, the Dominicans believed preaching to be the apostolic life. It
was enshrined within the Dominican constitutions that the Dominican
order was founded for “the sake of preaching and salvation of souls”
and all our concern should be primarily and passionately directed to
this all-important goal, that we should be able to be useful to the souls
of our neighbors.44
41. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum in primum librum sententiarum, ed. P. Mandonnet
and M. Moos, (Paris, 1929), d. iii, q. i, art. ii, 1–3, respondeo 1.
42. Simon Tugwell, Early Dominicans (New York), p. 3.
43. Tugwell, Early Dominicans, p. 5.
44. Cited in Tugwell, Early Dominicans, p. 457. Tugwell’s introduction to the
translated documents collected here offers a fascinating account of Dominican spiri-
tuality which he has also elaborated elsewhere—most notably in Ways of Imperfection:
An Exploration of Christian Spirituality (London, 1984) and in his entry “The Domini-
cans” in Cheslyn Jones et al., The Study of Spirituality (London, 1984), pp. 296–300.
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As Tugwell again writes, personal spiritual growth was never a legitimate
goal in its own right for the early Dominicans, but was rather a kind of
“spin-off” from their service of others.45
However, there is more to the absence of interiority in early Dominican
spirituality than merely a difference of emphasis. It should be remembered
that Dominic’s idea of “helping the souls of others” was to return them to
the Mother Church from which they had strayed. The Franciscans repre-
sented the thin end of the cultural wedge. Popular religion, whether ortho-
dox or not (and authorities had difficulty in knowing where to draw the
line), was representative of what some historians have described as the
“discovery of the individual.”46 A spirituality which emphasized personal
experience and which encouraged the emergence of more localized bear-
ers of revelation was at least perceived (often rightly) as threatening toward
central doctrinal authorities. If the differences between Saint Francis and
Saint Dominic can be put into a nutshell, then it would be to say that
whereas Francis was representative of the new popular spirituality, Dominic
was representative of the suspiscion and fear which that spirituality engen-
dered within the establishment.
Aquinas’s rejection of Anselm’s argument is integral to an approach to
the knowledge of God which eschews interiority more generally. In the early
sentence commentary Aquinas argues that the knowledge of God may be
inserted within the soul, insofar as it has its knowledge as a reflection of the
first truth, but this is not a knowledge of what God is in God’s self. Nor does
the mind know God when it knows truth. It may know a reflection of the
first truth, but not the first truth in itself. God is not the continual and
immediate cause of the intellect’s knowing. Although present to the soul,
God is not present as an object of knowledge—a view that is contrary not
only to reason, but also to faith. The intellect is unable to come to ‘pure
intelligibles’, or beings that are beyond the reach of the senses except by
means of argument based upon sensory knowledge. According to Aquinas,
even the soul itself cannot be known without inference from knowledge
derived from the senses: a view that seems to rule out the very possibility of
direct interior knowledge altogether.47
Was Aquinas here contributing to a wider picture of God which reflected
Dominican experience? Although there are counter-examples, there is evi-
dence to suggest that once again the significance of the key thinker lay in
representivity rather than originality. Aquinas’s arguments were formed
within, and on behalf of, a community of interpretation.
45. Tugwell, Early Dominicans, p. 4.
46. See Colin Morris, The Discovery of the Individual, 1050–1200 (London,
1972). See also Caroline Walker Bynum, “Did the Twelfth Century Discover the
Individual?,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 31 (1980): 1–18; and C. Morris, “Indi-
vidualism in Twelfth Century Religion: Some Further Reflections,” in Journal of
Ecclesiastical History 31 (1980): 195–206.
47. Aquinas, Scriptum in primum librum, d. iii, q. i, art. ii, respondeo 2–3.
ANSELM’S ARGUMENT AND THE FRIARS 95
Aquinas’s teacher, Albertus Magnus, had, in contrast to his Franciscan
contemporaries, already emphasized a distinction between the instruments
of  theology intended for edifying the faithful, and those intended for
defending the faith against its detractors. Whereas the Scriptures belonged
to the former and to the latter category, the arguments of the sentence
commentary belonged entirely to the latter.48 Although Anselm’s argument
was known to the early Dominican school, Albert’s commentary ignores it;
rather, he is interested in a different set of issues.49 While the Franciscans
were concerned with the question of whether God’s existence was naturally
inserted within the soul and incapable of being denied, Albert was con-
cerned with the extent to which the ancient philosophers were able to
attain a natural knowledge of God without faith: a position which already
marked out a different approach to Aristotle.50 Even before Aquinas, Albert
was concerned with arguments a posteriori—that is, arguments for God’s
existence and nature derived from sources of knowledge shared by believer
and unbeliever alike.
In a commentary which appears to have been widely distributed
throughout the order, Thomas’s direct contemporary at Paris, Peter of
Tarentaise, shared the same emphasis upon argument as a means of defend-
ing the faith rather than edifying the faithful.51 He also shared Thomas’s
views on the soul’s dependence on the senses for knowledge of spiritual
48. Albertus Magnus, Opera Omnia (Paris, 1890–1899), t. 25, Commentarii in
sententiarum, lib. I, dist. i, art. v: “Quod concedimus, dicentes quod habitus eius
lumen fidei est: instrumentum autem duplex secundum duplicem finem doctrinae
artis, qui duplex promissus finis est in auctoritate Apostoli, scilicet, exhortari in
doctrina sana, et contradicentes revincere . . . In quantum autem finis est, scilicet
contradicentes revincere, habet . . . (hoc) modum. Contradicens enim non revinci-
tur nisi duobus, scilicet probatione veritatis, et manifestatione erroris. Hoc autem
non fit nisi per argumentationem congruam ea ratione auctoritatis, vel naturalis
rationis, vel similitudinis congrue sumptam: et sic hoc modo argumentatio talis erit
instrumentum eius, et (ut patet in proemio) iste modus est scientiae istius libri, alii
autem modi sunt observati in Biblia.”
49. John of Treviso—a Dominican who studied at Paris, but who never held
the master’s chair—cited Anselm’s argument in a cursory treatment of God’s
existence at the beginning of his Compendium Theologiae (Vatican ms. lat. 1187, fols
1r–1v) composed at Paris between 1235 and 1244. The contemporary sentence
commentary of Hugh of St. Cher (consulted at Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms.
lat. 3073), on the other hand, considers the natural knowledge of God in distinction
iii (fols 8r–9r), but only briefly mentions the arguments employed by the Lombard
himself. The glosses of Hugh’s disciples on the commentary (Paris, Bibliothèque
Nationale ms. lat. 3423, and Assisi ms. lat. 131) barely mention the natural knowl-
edge of God’s existence let alone Anselm’s Proslogion. Only fragments remain of the
Dominican commentaries of John Pointlasne and Stephan of Venizy (Paris, Bib-
liothèque Nationale, ms. lat. 15652, fols 81–88 and lat. 3073, fol. 8r).
50. Albertus Magnus, Commentarii, dist. iii, art. I, “An philosophi cognoverunt
unum esse Deum.”
51. For a list of the manuscripts, see Glorieux, Répertoire des Maîtres, i, n. 17.
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beings—including its knowledge of itself.52 In addition, Peter identified
Lombard’s original arguments with Aristotle’s four causes and cited the
problem of evil to show how God’s existence could not be self-evi-
dent—both of which were to form sources of Thomas’s discussion in the
Summa Theologiae.53 Thomas’s bachelor, Annibald d’Annibaldi, followed
Aquinas in stressing that the object of arguments in theology was to defend
the faith against detractors, and followed Thomas’s emphasis that the soul’s
knowledge both of God and of itself was inferential.54 In addition, and in
stark contrast to his Franciscan contemporaries, Annibald argued explicitly
that, in natural knowledge, the will should follow reason and never the
reverse.55 Finally, between 1259 and 1265, Bombolgnous of Bologna com-
posed a sentence commentary which rejected the self-evidence of God’s
existence, and affirmed the dependence of the soul upon the senses for
knowledge of spiritual beings and even of its very self. At the very least, this
suggests that ideas circulating within the Parisian school attracted adher-
ents within the order from further afield.56 Only in the next life, Bombolog-
nous argued, would the soul know God’s existence as a self-evident truth.57
In other parts of the Dominican world, however, Thomas’s views were
not so welcome. Ulrich of Strassbourg’s Summa de Bono illustrates that
Aquinas’s differences with his former classmates in Cologne were more
than just linguistic. Perhaps in direct opposition to Thomas, Bombolog-
nous, Annibald, Peter, and others, Ulrich argued that God’s existence was
self-evident to the soul, naturally inserted, the source of its knowledge, and
52. Innocent V, In IV Libros Sententiarum Commentaria, ed. T. Turci and J. B. de
Marinis (Toulouse, 1652), Prol. art. i, ad obi. 3; arts. v–vi; lib I, dist. iii, quest. i–ii.
53. Innocent V, lib. I, dist. iii, qu.i.
54. Annibald d’Annibaldi, Scriptum super libris magistri sententiarum, pub. in
Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia (Parma, 1852–1873), 22, lib. I, prologus and dist. iii.
55. Annibald, lib I, prologus, q. iii. art. iv, respondeo.
56. According to both F. Stegmueller, Repertorium Commentariorum In Sententias
Petri Lombardi (Wurzburg, 1947), p. 108 and T. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedica-
torum medii Aevi (Rome, 1970–1993), v, i, pp. 246–47, Bombolognous composed his
commentary on the Sentences sometime between 1256 and 1265. Bologna Universi-
taria ms. 753 (1506), fol. 6r: “Laudabile est fide defendere contra adversaria quos
non potest fieri auctoribus quia non recipiuntur. Ergo ordinata quod fiat rationi-
bus.” Fol. 13v, dist. iii, art. ii, respondeo: “quia quiditas dei non est nobis per se nota
propter eius elongacionem ab sensu nostro divinitas est sensibile non et non
percipere vero dicitur potest . . . ideo deum esse . . . ad nos non est per se nota sed
indiget demonstratione.” Fol. 13v, art iii, ad obj. 3: “Ad sic didicitur quod ratio
procedit quia intellectus noster se cognoscet enim non per se dum est in corpore;
non cogit sed per accidens, videlicet per obiecta actus suus. Philosophus de anima
dicit quia intellectus est intelligible sicut alia intelligibilia quia exposito communis
dicit quia intellectus se intellegit per intentionem sicut alia intelligibilia.”
57. Bombolognous, fol. 13v, d. iii, art. ii, respondeo: “In autem Patria . . . deum
esse videbitur multo amplius et nobis notum quam nunc sit per se notum quia
affirmatio et negetio non sint similem.”
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incapable of being thought not to be.58 In Oxford, Richard Fishacre had
argued that the knowledge of God’s existence was naturally inserted within
the soul, a view that was shared by his successor, Robert Kilwardby.59 It may
well have been against these early Oxford Dominicans that Aquinas di-
rected his arguments, even if later on the debate was fought more with
contemporary  Franciscans than with other Dominicans. However, even
beyond the 1270s there continued to be Dominican masters who were not
content to defend an entirely Thomistic doctrine—Meister Eckhart and
Durand of St. Pourçain, in particular, fell foul of the Dominican authorities.
Although there remained counter-traditions within the Dominican order
beyond the thirteenth century, however, none came to hold the influence
within the community that was soon acquired by Thomas.60 By 1278, the
Dominican leadership was sending representatives to Oxford to rebuke
those Dominicans who, in scandalum ordinis, had shown disrespect to the
venerable Thomas.61
That Thomas’s approach succeeded over its rivals in Dominican order
was due not merely to the fact that it encapsulated a Dominican approach
to the spiritual life, but that it also encapsulated an approach to natural
knowledge that such an approach demanded. To the Dominican insistence
upon the exterior sources of revealed authority, Aquinas adds an insistence
upon the exterior sources of intellectual knowledge—available to believers
and unbelievers alike. It is because everyone has equal access to natural
knowledge that the preacher can appeal to it in conversing with the
unbeliever.
It would be natural at this point to assume that Aquinas (followed by
the Dominicans) used arguments for apologetic ends while the Franciscans
used them for contemplative ends. However, it is a mistake to draw the
contrast in quite those terms. It is more that argument occupied different
roles in the two orders. The fact of God’s existence was not in question for
either of them, but the question of whether God’s existence was the subject
of rational proof had implications for the nature of theological discourse.
In this context neither Aquinas nor the Franciscans used arguments to
establish the existence of God within a shared rationality, but rather to
contribute to a wider debate about the kind of shared rationality that was
58. Ulrich of Strassbourg, Summa de Bono, ed. J. Daguillon, Bibliothèque Thomiste
12 (1930): lib. I, cap. iii–viii.
59. For Richard Fishacre, see P. A. Daniels, Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen
zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Dreizehnten Jahrhundert, (Müunster, 1909), pp.
21–24. Compare Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, Auctores Britannici medii
Aevi, iv, ed. A. G. Judy (Toronto, 1976), cap. xxvii. See also James A. Weisheipl,
Thomas d’Aquino and Albert His Teacher (Toronto, 1980); 14.
60. See M. Burbach, “Early Dominican and Franciscan Legislation Regarding
St. Thomas” Mediaeval Studies 4 (1942): 139–58.
61. Cited in D. Callus, The Condemnation of St. Thomas Aquinas at Oxford (Ox-
ford, 1946), pp. 33–34.
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possible in a monothestic universe—was it a rationality which depended
upon faith or not? If understanding depended upon faith, then arguments
were less important  than preaching  by example—as  Saint Francis had
insisted all along. Aquinas’s God carried very different implications for
natural knowledge than the God of Franciscan thought: it did not prejudice
natural knowledge in favor of the believer. For that reason natural knowl-
edge could provide a useful tool for the Friars Preachers whose whole
vocation was defined in terms of oral persuasion.
Just as Bonaventure had given the Franciscan project its most detailed
articulation to date in the Itinerarium, Thomas gave the Dominican strategy
its most detailed expression in the Summa contra gentiles. Historians have
roundly rejected the traditional view that this work was composed at the
request of Raymond of Pennyafort for the conversion of Muslims in Spain.62
While the historical basis of this legend has been torn apart, however, it is
wrong to conclude that the Summa contra gentiles could not have been
written with any practical missionary intent. Such an argument rests on the
assumption that natural theology could not have had an apologetic role in
this period and that the job of apologetics is always to attack and refute the
errors of unbelievers. If that were the case then the conspicuous absence of
such concerns in the Summa contra gentiles would entail that it could not
have been intended for this purpose.63 Norman Kretzmann also puts for-
ward the additional argument that books I through III of the Summa are
concerned with theism rather than with specific teachings of Christianity,
and as such contain little or nothing that Muslims would object to. If
Aquinas had intended the work for a Muslim audience, therefore, he was
waisting his time until he got to book IV, which contains probable argu-
ments relating to the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation.64
This is to prescribe the roles both of natural theology and of apolo-
getics, however, without considering how missionaries actually function.
Clearly neither Aquinas nor any of his contemporaries would have felt any
need to convince Muslims that God exists. As John Clayton has written,
however, it would seem more likely that by rehearsing such proofs Aquinas
was defending an account of God’s unity so cherished by his Muslim con-
temporaries, but which was nonetheless compatible with the Christian doc-
trine of the Trinity.65 Indeed, Thomas deliberately presented his arguments
not in their original Aristotelian form, but in the form they took after they
had passed through the hands of near-contemporary Arab commentators.66
62. See the magisterial refutation of this view by René-Antoine Gauthier O.P.,
Saint Thomas d’Aquin, ‘Somme contre Les Gentils’: Introduction (1993).
63. See Gauthier, Saint Thomas d’Aquin, pp. 109–42, and Norman Kretzmann,
The Metaphysics of Theis: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in “Summa contra gentiles” I (Ox-
ford, 1997), pp. 43–51.
64. Kretzmann, Metaphysics, p. 50
65. John Clayton, “Religions, Reasons and Gods,” Religious Studies 23 (1987): 12.
66. Clayton “Religions,” p. 3
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Had such arguments been directed toward Muslims in newly-conquered
Christian territories, they would have been reassured that becoming Chris-
tian did not involve giving up beliefs that they already held, or committing
the sin of polytheism.67 The very act of setting out the truth of Christian
faith in this way serves also to set aside errors contrary to Christian be-
lief—that Christianity involves compromising the unity of God. Thomas
reserves discussion of the most disputed doctrines between Christians and
Muslims—the incarnation and Trinity—until the last book after expressing
the doctrine of God in a way acceptable to both traditions.
This is not an argument for singling out the Summa contra gentiles as a
missionary work, but rather for seeing the Summa as an articulation of the
approach to the unbeliever embedded in the Dominican vocation gener-
ally, and particularly as it was formulated in the natural theology of Aquinas
and his contemporaries. One merit of this view is that it makes sense of
Aquinas’s explicit references to the conviction of Muslims by means of
reason. If his project in the Summa contra gentiles was not intended to carry
any implications for missionary activity, it is difficult to see why he would
have mentioned unbelievers at all, not merely in passing, but as a justifica-
tion for the whole approach he was adopting. Natural theology in Thomas’s
writing, and in the writings of his near contemporaries at Paris and Bologna,
is intrinsically concerned with edifying the souls of others.
The discussion of the existence of God in the Summa again begins with
the refutation of the view that God’s existence is self-evident and with it, of
course, the argument of Anselm. As a result, God is not the first object of
the human mind, but is an inference from nature that is known equally to
believers and unbelievers. While faith may temporally precede knowledge,
it does not contribute to that knowledge epistemically or logically. Natural
theology becomes a discourse capable of transcending religious bounda-
ries, while making religious difference available for rational debate.
Having eliminated the view that God’s existence is self-evident, the
arguments employed to establish the existence of God in the Summa contra
gentiles reflect a set of religious priorities different from those of Aquinas’s
Franciscan contemporaries. Whereas the Franciscans stressed the priority
of the soul’s direct relationship with God over its knowledge of all else,
Aquinas, following Albertus Magnus, emphasized a different way of ‘seeing’
God. The natural knowledge of God is attained, for Aquinas, not by means
67. The unity of God or Tawhid, expressed as “God is one, there is no God but
God,” is central to the Islamic tradition and to the social consciousness of Islamic
culture. The root of the word Islam, slm in Arabic means “to be in peace, to be an
integral whole,” just as God is one. The root of all error according to Islam is
shirk—the sin of polytheism broadly interpreted as the association of anything with
the Divine: “God forgives not that anything should associated with him” (Quran,
4.116). See for example, Fazlur Rahman, “Islam: An Overview,” in M. Eliade,
Encyclopaedia of Religions; Dominique Sordel, Medieval Islam (London and New York,
1979).
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of an introspection that transcends the body, but by inference from nature
for which the soul is dependent upon the bodily senses. Moreover, the God
inferred from the knowledge of the senses is a God of government and
causation:
Contrary and discordant things cannot, always or for the most part, be
parts of one order except under someone’s government, which enables
all and each to tend to a definite end. But in the world we find that
things of diverse natures come together under one order, and this not
rarely or by chance, but always or for the most part. There must
therefore be some being by whose providence the world is governed.
This we call God.68
The third book of the Summa contra gentiles, states that our supreme glory is
to be helpers of God by means of the causality which we exercise. Following
the pseudo-Dionysius, Aquinas argues, “the most divine thing of all is to
become a co-operator with God.”69 It is no coincidence that within Domini-
can tradition “God’s co-worker” was already becoming an epithet for the
preacher.70 Hence, Aquinas’s rejection of Anselm’s argument was integral
to an account of God encapsulating a very different form of spiritual life
and an approach to natural knowledge which that form of life entailed. To
adopt the office of the wise, as Aquinas does in the Summa contra gentiles, is
in fact to conform to the image of the intellectual agent that governs the
world, and to co-operate with God in the act of ruling and ordering things
toward their proper end in God.
The interiority of the Franciscan account of God was incompatible with
68. Thomas Aquinas, Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei Contra Errores Infidelium
Qui Dicitur Summa Contra Gentiles, 3 vols., ed. P. Marc, C. Pera and P. Caramello
(Turin–Paris, 1967), pp. I:539–54. Quotations are from this edition. Lib I, cap. 13,
115: “Impossibile est aliqua contraria et dissonantia in unum ordinem concordare
semper vel pluries nisi alicuius gubernatione, ex qua omnibus et singulis tribuitur
ut ad certum finem tendant. Sed in mundo videmus res diversarum naturarum in
unum ordinem concordare, non ut raro et a casu, sed ut semper vel in maiori parte.
Oportet ergo esse aliquem cuius providentia mundus gubernetur.” See also Alber-
tus Magnus, In sententiarum, lib. I, dist. iii, art. ii: “Nec est simile de fabro lignorum
et domo, et Deo: quia faber lignorum separatur a domo, et opus eius similiter, et
transit. Unde etiam sequitur: si domus est, faber lignarius est, vel fuit. Sed in Deo
opus universaliter non separatur a creatura: quia postquam creata est, adhuc in
nihilum caderet nisi contineretur ab ipso: et ordo eius in universo corrumperetur,
nisi ab ipso gubernaretur. Non tamen dico, quod sequatur, quod Deus fuit: sed
sequatur, quod ipse est propter rationem aeternitatis quae est tota simul et per-
fecta.”
69. Summa contra Gentiles, lib. III, cap. 2023: “Unde Dionysius dicit III Cap.
Caelestis Hierarchiae, quod omnium divinius est Dei cooperatorem fieri: secundum quod
Apostolus dicit, I Corinth. 3, 9: Dei adiutores sumus.”
70. See Humbert of Romans’ “The Formation of a Preacher,” in Tugwell, Early
Dominicans, pp. 181–325.
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the priorities of the Dominican order. By criticizing Anselm’s argument as
it  had  been used  by  his  contemporaries,  Aquinas was  questioning the
consistency of a particular view of God—both with Christian teaching and
with human knowledge more generally. On both counts, Aquinas found the
Franciscan arguments to be deficient. God is not self-evident to the soul,
since—as the Scriptures teach—we  have no vision of God in this life.
Moreover, God’s existence is not a self-evident truth since it is capable of
being denied and of being the conclusion of a demonstration. If Aquinas
was right, however, not only the Franciscan account of the natural knowl-
edge of God, but a key assumption of Franciscan spirituality would be
undermined. Before long, Franciscan defenders of Anselm had to respond
to these criticisms—this time emanating from outwith their order.
III
Franciscan and Dominican masters in the late thirteenth century engaged
in polemics over Thomas’s teaching not merely because he became a focus
for intellectual rivalries, but because their intellectual differences were
essentially religious. It was in the course of scholastic debate—through the
teachings of such masters as Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise, Bonaven-
ture, and John Peckham—that those religious differences received expres-
sion and were brought into consciousness. For that reason, debate
contributed to the development of traditions. In the 1280s the Franciscan
John Peckham talked about Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure express-
ing “the doctrine of the sons of Saint Francis” in opposition to the teachings
of the Dominican order, while Franciscan and Dominican legislation re-
garding the status of Saint Thomas ran in opposing directions.71
The role of Anselm’s argument in these debates is illustrated by John
Peckham’s attempt to defend Anselm’s argument against Thomas Aqui-
nas’s criticism. Although Peckham affirmed that the knowledge of truth
within the human mind is sourced in the infallible light of God, he agreed
with Aquinas that the divine light by which we know things should not be
confused with what we know by it. To say that we know by God’s light,
therefore,  is not  to say that we know  God. Peckham  stresses  that  our
inserted knowledge of God is not a knowledge of what God is, and this is
precisely what Anselm shows in the Proslogion. Neither the Franciscans nor
Anselm himself claim to derive God’s existence from a knowledge of God’s
nature. The mind’s knowledge of God is apophatic. It knows only what God
is not: it knows that God is not something than which a greater can be
71. Iohannis Peckham Registrum Epistolarum, iii, ed. C. T. Martin, in Rerum
Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores (London, 1885), lxxvii, pp. 896–902. For legisla-
tion see Burbach, “Early Dominican and Franciscan Legislation.”
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thought and, therefore, that God cannot be thought not to be. Like Aqui-
nas, Peckham was able to affirm that it is precisely because we do not know
God’s quiddity that God’s existence is denied by some. It is because some
mistake God for something other than God—as the Franciscan school had
consistently argued—that they conclude God does not exist.72 Hence, ac-
cording to Peckham, Anselm’s argument was consistent both with Christian
truth and with reason.
For  the  time being, then, the  Franciscans resisted the  Dominican
critique using the arguments of Alexander and the earliest Franciscan
masters. In the long run, however, the approach to knowledge which domi-
nated Franciscan scholasticism in the mid-thirteenth century could not be
sustained against the broader critique of Dominican and other masters. The
treatment of Anselm’s argument in the work of Duns Scotus represents an
important change of strategy in the defense of Franciscan interests—inter-
ests that continued to be represented in the work of William of Ockham.73
Even within the period that has been covered here there is much more that
could be said relating to the context and content of debates concerning the
natural knowledge of God. Philosophical enquiry opened up the space
within the context of orthodox teaching where real differences of interpre-
tation were already being lived out. The rivalry between the Franciscans and
the Dominicans was so intense precisely because they both claimed to
represent the same God, and yet understood God in mutually incompatible
ways. Their accounts of God were significant precisely because they repre-
sented the expression in theory of the very forms of life that the Franciscans
and the Dominicans lived. In disputation, the orders defended and con-
tested the coherence of their religious selves—selves formed within commu-
nities of interest.
It seems fair to describe the role of philosophy in this context in
Richard Rorty’s terms, as conversational rather than as foundational.74 This
is partly because the arguments were rehearsed in “oral” texts—in this case
notes for lectures to an audience being trained in oral disputation. The
techniques of disputation were important for religious vocations in which
72. The section of John Peckham’s sentence commentary dealing with the
existence of God is found in Daniels, Quellenbeiträge, pp. 41–50: “[I sententiarum, d.
ii, q. 2, ad secundo respondeo] . . . quamuis sit naturaliter notum Deum esse, non
tamen quid sit Deus est notum: et ideo plures existimantes de Dei quidditate intra
concludunt Deum non esse.” (pp. 49–50).
73. Unfortunately, these are issues that will have to await another article.
74. A historical comparison of the use of theistic argument by John Locke and
Thomas Aquinas illustrating the shift in the use of theistic arguments more gener-
ally between the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment, is presented by Nicholas
Wolterstorff, “The Migration of the Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to
Evidentialist Apologetics,” in R. Audi and W. J. Wainwright, Rationality, Religious
Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion (Cornell, 1986),
pp. 38–81. For Richard Rorty’s account of philosophy as “edifying conversation,”
see The Mirror of Nature (Blackwell, 1982).
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“conversation” with the Other was central. In one sense, the friars’ central
disagreement was over how that conversation should be conducted. Did the
natural knowledge of God somehow depend (paradoxically) upon the prior
acceptance of faith? The role of philosophy was also conversational, how-
ever, in another sense. Arguments were used to defend and contest differ-
ence, and in the case of both the Itinerarium and the Summa contra gentiles,
to help overcome it as well. Anselm’s argument did not function in these
texts to provide foundations for religious belief—medieval people were
hardly  in need  of rational foundations for what they believed—but to
articulate and make available for public inquiry the rationality implicit
within religious practice.
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